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Is the world running out of oil? 
Though almost no one expects the 
black stuff to literally stop coming out 
of the ground anytime soon, some sug-
gest that oil production, having trended 
upwards for the past century, will soon 
reach a year of maximum produc-
tion—a peak—and then decline. The 
notion of a peak denotes a discern-
able change in the trend; as an alterna-
tive, some people argue a “plateau” of 
roughly constant production is more 
likely instead. In either case, given a 
ﬁ  nite amount of oil, production must 
decline sometime, and the question 
then becomes: When will world oil pro-
duction peak, and what will be the eco-
nomic consequences?
Most discussions of peak oil trace the 
concept back to the work of the geolo-
gist M. King Hubbert, who in the 1950s 
correctly predicted a peak in U.S. oil 
production between the mid 1960s and 
early 1970s. Later, in a 1976 National 
Geographic article, Hubbert predicted 
a world oil peak for 1995, and though 
this did not come about, the notion that 
oil production would soon peak and 
start declining is now often referred to 
“Hubbert’s peak.” 
This approach to the problem of how 
much oil is available should not be con-
fused with another popular approach, 
that of looking at proven oil reserves. 
Most people don’t readily grasp exactly 
whether say, 500 gigabarrels is a lit-
tle or a lot, so reserves are usually 
expressed in terms of how long they 
would last at current rates of usage. 
For example, the Financial Times ran 
the headline “World still has 40 years 
of oil, says BP.” (June 13, 2007.) This 
approach to determining our remaining 
supply of oil becomes obviously ﬂ  awed 
when the actual numbers are exam-
ined: in 1950, years of supply stood at 
22. In 1972, the supply was of course 
not zero, and it had increased to 35 
years; now in 2007, reserves stand at 
40 years. (BP Statistical Review, 2007.) 
The problem comes in thinking of these 
proven reserves as a measure of the oil 
left in the earth. Rather, as one expert 
puts it: “reserves are deﬁ  ned as the 
known amounts of a mineral that can 
be proﬁ  tably produced at current prices 
using current technology.” (Fisher, 
1981, p. 94) As exploration contin-
ues, technology advances, and prices 
increase, more oil becomes available. 
Economically, reserves are more akin 
to a store’s inventory than to some ulti-
mate measure of resource availability. 
While most people think of reserves 
increasing with new discoveries and 
decreasing as oil is pumped out of the 
ground, reserves also increase when 
new techniques make it cheaper to 
pump more oil and decrease when the 
price of oil falls. So, for example, fuel-
efﬁ  cient hybrid cars might decrease 
oil reserves because they decrease the 
demand for oil, driving down the price, 
making some oil reserves no longer 
economically feasible.
  Trends
Peak oil analysis looks not at reserves 
but at production (extraction), the 
yearly ﬂ  ow rather than the stock. The 
problem of reckoning future supply 
then becomes discerning the trend in 
production. A look at total world pro-
duction of crude oil (ﬁ  gure 1) does not 
show any obvious signs of decreasing 
production. Since 1965, world produc-
tion has increased at an average of 
2.4 percent per year. Indeed, ﬁ  tting a 
simple trend and extrapolating from the 
past suggests that production will keep 
on increasing. Clearly, barring extra
terrestrial sources, this increase can’t 
go on forever, but what evidence is 
there that it might stop anytime soon? 
Those expecting an imminent peak in 
oil production employ a different type 
of trend line, a nonlinear sort.
Suppose instead of drawing a straight 
line through the production data we 
draw a curve, such as a logistic. Why 
would we want to do this? For one, this 
pattern has appeared before. Oil pro-
duction in the United States, shown in 
ﬁ  gure 2, did follow a nonlinear trend, 
increasing, ﬂ  attening out, and then 
decreasing. A logistic trend, also drawn 
in ﬁ  gure 2, ﬁ  ts this pattern well for the 
U.S., so there is some reason to think 
that total world production may follow 
such a trend. Figure 3 shows what a 
logistic trend could look like for world 
oil production. Using statistical meth-
ods to choose the logistic curve that 
best ﬁ  ts the oil data yields 2014 as the 
year of peak oil production. 
Another reason for considering a logis-
tic curve follows from a rather subtle 
pattern in the data. Plotting yearly oil 
production (P) as a fraction of cumula-
tive oil production (Q) against cumu-
lative oil production, as in ﬁ  gure 4, 
shows a declining trend. More impor-
tantly, after about 1980, that trend 
When will the world’s produc-
tion of oil peak, and what will the 
economic consequences be? Cal-
culating when turns out not to be 
so straightforward as it seems, but 
predicting the likely economic con-
sequences is—and they’re not as 
bleak as many fear. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Clevelandbecomes linear, showing a roughly 
constant rate of decline in production 
as a fraction of cumulative production. 
In fractions, this linear trend translates 
to a logistic trend in production levels 
(Deffeyes 2005 provides some intuition 
for this mathematical fact, or for the 
hard stuff, check your favorite differen-
tial equations textbook).
In fact, this provides another approach 
to estimating the year of peak oil: ﬁ  t 
the linear trend, and translate that into 
a logistic curve for production. The  
answer this method yields depends a 
bit on when you start the series, but our 
calculations show a peak in oil produc-
tion in 2007.
The two different approaches give two 
different answers (2014 and 2007), but 
the range of uncertainty is even larger, 
because these are statistical estimates, 
subject to error. One advantage of sta-
tistical techniques, however, is that they 
give us estimates of how big the errors 
are expected to be, and thus give some 
notion of how conﬁ  dent we should be 
in the predictions. In fact, it’s a useful 
exercise to look at the estimation error 
of the coefﬁ  cients and see what bounds 
those put on peak oil.
For the nonlinear logistic case (2014), 
the 95 percent conﬁ  dence bounds are 
1989 and 2040. For the linear case 
(2007), the estimates put peak oil 
between 2004 and 2010. Looking at 
both estimates together puts peak oil 
somewhere in a 50-year band (though, 
obviously, 1989 was not a peak), again 
suggesting that dating the peak in oil 
production is an imprecise exercise. 
   Does Peak Oil Mean 
$200 a Barrel?
To some people, the notion of peak oil 
sounds scary. What will the future bring 
as the world moves from a century of 
increasing oil production to a period of 
decline? Despite the dramatic appeal 
of Road Warrior scenarios, with bar-
barians clashing over the few remain-
ing oil wells, reality should prove to 
be much more prosaic. The ﬁ  rst point 
to realize is that the peak represents 
the point of maximum production, not 
the date that oil runs out. Furthermore, 
the logistic curves all show a relatively 
ﬂ  at peak, with a pronounced “hang 
time” near the peak. Production along 
the curve in ﬁ  gure 3 shows a much 
smoother decline than in some recent 
episodes. In the ﬁ  rst oil crisis, world 
production dropped from 21.4 billion 
barrels (bbls) in 1974 to 20.4 bbls in 
1975. In the base peak oil scenario, it 
takes 10 years—from 2014 to 2024—
for a drop of that magnitude (0.7 bbls) 
to take place. A larger decline from 
24.1 to 20.7 bbls took place from 1979 
to 1983, but production (in our model) 
doesn’t drop off 3.4 bbls until 2034, 20 
years after the peak. 
Of course, there are more uncertain-
ties associated with these numbers than 
just those that arise from estimation 
error. The trend between annual pro-
duction as a fraction of total produc-
tion and cumulative production (P/Q 
and Q) changed between the 1960s and 
the 1980s, and quite possibly could 
change again. Estimates for P and Q 
are not certain, and for strategic reasons 
not all countries freely share their oil 
data. Furthermore, market disruptions 
such as OPEC cartels and technology 
changes or major new discoveries may 
shift demand and supply enough to dra-
matically change the peak in oil pro-
duction.
   Pumping Economically
The concept of peak oil originated with 
petroleum geologists and engineers, 
but oil production is not exclusively 
determined by geology: it results from 
the equilibrium of demand and supply. 
There are economic reasons that sug-
gest that a “peak oil” scenario might be 
plausible, but these reasons also con-
siderably lessen the scare factor in such 
a scenario. 
FIGURE 1  TOTAL ANNUAL WORLD  PRODUCTION OF 
CRUDE OIL
FIGURE 2  U.S. PEAK OIL
Source: Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration; and  
authors’ calculations.



















Peak: 1976, 3.3 gigabarrelsThe standard economic story argues 
that production takes place until price 
equals the marginal production cost—
that is, the point at which the cost of 
producing one more unit is just offset 
by the price for which you can sell that 
unit. Just like any other good, higher 
prices will call forth more oil (drilling 
in colder areas, moving further out on 
the continental shelf, and so forth) and 
also reduce demand, as people sub-
stitute away from oil by driving less, 
turning down the heat, and buying a 
solar heater for their pool. In the case 
of oil, it’s a little trickier because there 
is an added cost—pumping oil today 
means you can’t use that oil tomor-
row. This adds what economists call 
an “opportunity cost” or a “rent” to the 
marginal cost. Oilmen would often call 
it a premium or royalty. In either case, 
it means the price of oil is often quite 
higher than the cost of pumping it out 
of the ground—which is exactly as it 
should be because it is a resource in 
ﬁ  xed supply.
Finding the best pattern of oil produc-
tion thus comes down to specifying 
the path of the royalty over time. This 
should make sense because the net 
social gain from pumping oil today is 
the price less the production cost, that 
is, the royalty. Consider the choice 
between pumping the oil now or next 
year. If we are depleting oil at the 
optimal rate, we should be indifferent 
between the choices. For example, if 
oil is more valuable in the future, we 
should forego pumping it today and 
leave it in the ground for next year, 
when it is worth more. When will we 
FIGURE 3  WORLD PEAK OIL
FIGURE 4  ANNUAL PRODUCTION AS A FRACTION OF 
TOTAL 
Source: BP Statistical Review 2006; and authors’ calculations.


























be indifferent about when we pump? 
The ﬁ  rst guess would be when the 
royalty is equal in both periods. This 
is not quite right, because of the time 
value of money—a dollar today is not 
the same as a dollar next year, because 
you can put the dollar today in a bank, 
earn interest, and get more than a dol-
lar tomorrow. Thus, tomorrow’s royalty 
should be larger than today’s by the rate 
of interest. Roughly speaking, you have 
two choices—pump the oil today and 
sell it, putting the money in the bank, or 
pump the oil next year, and sell it then. 
The payoff should be the same. 
In the simplest case of applying this 
logic, with a known, ﬁ  xed supply of 
oil and with zero extraction costs, we 
get what economists call Hotelling’s 
rule: the price should rise at the rate 
of interest. With a ﬁ  xed supply of oil, 
this means that in each period, less and 
less oil is produced (thus increasing the 
price). In this case, optimal oil deple-
tion looks like the down side of the 
Hubbert curve. That has a lesson: With 
a known, ﬁ  nite amount of a resource, 
gradually extracting less over time is 
the best thing to do, balancing off cur-
rent returns against future beneﬁ  ts. The 
gradually increasing price serves to 
conserve oil and also provides incen-
tives for increased exploration and pro-
duction.
Would peak oil ever look optimal? The 
analysis so far has ignored explora-
tion. In fact, the world did not start out 
with a “known, ﬁ  xed supply of oil.” 
At one time no one knew there was oil 
in Texas, much less the Middle East, 
and Cleveland was the oil capital of 
the world! 
With exploration, the price of oil ini-
tially drops as the large oil ﬁ  elds get 
discovered and world supply increases. 
Eventually, it becomes harder and 
harder to ﬁ  nd more oil (think drilling 
further and further out into the conti-
nental shelf), and the increasing roy-
alty drives the price up. This pattern of 
a falling then rising price is reﬂ  ected in 
the quantity produced, which increases 
and then decreases—the pattern pre-
dicted by peak oil. Rather than indicat-
ing a failure or ﬂ  aw in the oil market, 
though, it represents the solution to the 
problem of balancing demand, produc-
tion costs, and the value of conserving 
oil for the future.Joseph G. Haubrich is a consultant and 
economist at the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Cleveland, and Brent Meyer is an eco-
nomic analyst at the Bank.
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   Uncertain, not Necessarily 
Gloomy Future
Peak oil suggests that, while we’ve 
enjoyed expanding production so far, 
some day in the future (near or not so 
near) production will peak and begin to 
wane. Future production of oil is uncer-
tain, but the uncertainty is not only 
about the amount of oil in the ground 
but also the costs and beneﬁ  ts of pump-
ing it. Oil is one source of energy, but 
economics teaches us that there are 
substitutes. A high enough price for 
oil will call forth increased explora-
tion, but also exploration of alternative 
sources, such as tar sands and oil shale, 
that are not worth exploiting when oil 
prices are lower. 
In fact, one of the earliest uses for oil 
was to produce kerosene, a cheaper sub-
stitute for whale oil, though the electric 
light eventually made that petroleum 
product less vital. Thus there is substi-
tution in the uses of oil as well as the 
sources. It’s the interplay between these 
costs and alternatives that presents the 
true lesson of peak oil, though under-
standing the limits to growing trends 
represents an important ﬁ  rst step. 
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